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FOREIGN BANKS AND THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL
PIOTR DENDERSKI and WOJTEK PACZOS∗
We provide new evidence on bank ownership and transmission of monetary policy
using bank-level data on 453 banks in Central and Eastern European economies
between 1998 and 2012. Only domestic banks adjust loans to changes in monetary
policy, while foreign banks do not. Conventional wisdom says that this is because foreign
banks can rely on parent banks’ funding to insulate against monetary policy shocks. In
this paper we document an alternative explanation. Deposits in foreign banks do not
react to monetary policy, hence the bank lending channel is only triggered in domestic
banks. (JEL E50, F36, G21)
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial liberalization has led to an increased
integration of financial markets over the last
30 years. The emerging and developing coun-
tries, however, entered this process with under-
capitalized banks. In result of this, large shares
of the financial sector in these countries are con-
trolled by subsidiaries of foreign banks. In this
paper we investigate the implications of foreign
ownership for the monetary policy transmission
through bank loans.
The traditional bank lending channel postu-
lates that after a monetary policy contraction,
both banks’ reserves and deposits decrease.
If there is imperfect substitutability between
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different types of bank funding (e.g., due to
frictions that impede trade between banks), or
a bank is liquidity constrained, then the supply
of loans falls, as an indirect consequence of a
monetary policy tightening. This is a separate,
supply side mechanism from the direct “interest
rate channel” which reduces aggregate demand.
In this paper, we look at foreign ownership
as a credit supply-side determinant of monetary
transmission. Whether the transmission works
analogously in foreign and domestic banks is an
important policy question, especially so in coun-
tries with significant presence of foreign-owned
banks. We explore the consequences of asymmet-
ric financial integration in the particular area of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Banks domi-
nate the financial structure of the CEE economies
and many of them are majority foreign-owned,
following a period of rapid increase in foreign
penetration of the banking sector in the early and
mid-1990s. In CEE, firms rely on bank financ-
ing much more than on capital markets compared
with the United States. For this study, we have
collected data on credit, deposits, ownership and
other bank-level characteristics for 453 banks in
ten CEE countries in the years 1998–2012.
We make two contributions to the empirical
literature on the monetary policy transmission via
banks. First, we find that the supply of credit in
foreign banks does not respond to monetary pol-
icy, while in the domestic banks it does. Previous
contributions (reviewed later) document a less
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stark result, that the response of credit to mon-
etary policy is only weaker, in foreign than in the
domestic banks. This finding is robust to a bat-
tery of checks, including accounting for banks
heterogeneity other than ownership, differences
in issuance of foreign currency loans, and the spe-
cial role of the global financial crisis.
Second, we document a novel explanation for
the difference in the transmission mechanism: the
response of consumer deposits to monetary pol-
icy is absent in foreign banks while it is strong in
private domestic banks. Thus, the bank lending
channel in foreign banks is simply not triggered
after monetary policy changes. On top of that,
ownership is an important stand-alone determi-
nant of the structure of funding: foreign banks
enjoy lower cost of financing and rely less on con-
sumer deposits.
A. Related Literature
This paper is related to the two strands of lit-
erature: one studying the role of bank ownership
and one studying monetary policy transmission
via banks.
The relationship between foreign ownership
and the growth of credit at the bank level has
been receiving an increased interest in the litera-
ture since Peek and Rosengren (1997), who show
that in a response to the stock market slump in
Japan the Japanese-owned banks contracted their
lending in the United States. The CEE transition
economies are a natural field for empirical studies
on foreign banks as they exhibit variation in for-
eign banks penetration both in cross-section and
over time.1 For the earlier period of 1990s, De
Haas and van Lelyveld (2006) find that interest
rate did not affect the pace of growth of credit.
We find that this picture changed and the bank
lending channel was active in domestic, but not
in foreign banks in the CEE region.
The theoretical foundation of the bank lend-
ing channel was laid out in Stein (1998). Follow-
ing Kashyap and Stein (2000), identification of
effects of monetary policy on the supply of (and
not on the demand for) loans relies on panel bank-
level data. In the sample of U.S. banks, Cetorelli
and Goldberg (2012) show that having global
operations insulates banks from changes in local
monetary policy. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2016)
1. As of 2009 the share of foreign banks in the total assets
of the banking sectors in the CEE economies was greater than
80%. In other European Union member states this number
stood at 25% (own calculations based on Claessens and Van
Horen (2014)).
show that branches of conglomerates in more
complex families have a markedly lower lending
sensitivity to funding shocks. Temesvary (2018)
finds that in response to home country mone-
tary tightening, foreign banks with less access to
liquid funds reduce their business lending sub-
stantially more than foreign banks with more
funding access. In our sample foreign banks are
less liquid and less capitalized which, however,
does not constrain their response to monetary pol-
icy shocks. This is because their deposit base is
immune to monetary policy.
Our paper is closely related to Gamba-
corta (2005) and Wu, Luca, and Jeon (2011). In
Gambacorta (2005) the strength of the lending
response to monetary policy is related to a bank’s
holding of liquid assets and capitalization. The
bank lending channel is triggered when insured
deposits fall after a monetary contraction. We
complement this work by looking at foreignness,
which proves to be relevant for the trigger of
the bank lending channel transmission. Wu,
Luca, and Jeon (2011) provide evidence of a
weaker response of lending to monetary policy
in foreign banks and conclude that it is due to
their access to an internal capital market which
was particularly important during local crises
episodes. We find that lending by foreign banks
does not respond to monetary policy which is
due to the absence of the trigger of the bank
lending channel. Consumer deposits in foreign
banks do not react to monetary policy.
In the literature investigating the role of
foreign banks during crises it is found (Allen
et al. 2017; De Haas and van Lelyveld 2006;
Popov and Udell 2012) that they stabilize credit
in times of a domestic crisis. Ongena, Peydro, and
van Horen (2015) use matched bank-firm data
in CEE and Turkey to explore the consequences
of the Lehman failure. Adams-Kane, Caballero,
and Lim (2017) use global sample with matched
owner-subsidiary data to study responses of
foreign banks to home country crises. We find
that monetary policy only impacts bank lend-
ing in tranquil times and not during the global
financial crisis.
Last, but not least, Drechsler, Savov, and Schn-
abl (2017) documents the importance of dynam-
ics of deposits for the transmission of mone-
tary policy, uncovering a novel deposits channel.
We complement their finding by documenting a
quantitatively and qualitatively important hetero-
geneity in how deposits respond to monetary pol-
icy in banks of different ownership.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 lays out the data sources
and the empirical procedure. We present
benchmark results and robustness checks in
Section 3. Section 4 studies the reasons of the
observed difference in credit behavior. The last
section concludes.
II. DATA DESCRIPTION
We construct an unbalanced panel that con-
sists of bank-level and macroeconomic data. Our
primary source of data is Bankscope, a com-
mercial database provided by Bureau van Dijk.
Bankscope comprises a large number of stan-
dardized, comparable indicators at annual fre-
quency and has been used extensively in the
related literature. Ownership data are not eas-
ily accessible, as only the most recent owner is
reported in Bankscope. Thus, we complement
Bankscope with data sourced from individual
banks’ websites and financial statements. We
source macroeconomic data from the Eurostat
and national statistical offices.
The outcome of the data collection process
is a panel of 3,357 bank-year observations for
453 banks active for at least one year between
1998 and 2012 (out of the total of 514 banks
registered in Bankscope) in ten CEE countries.
Our ownership data cover 92% of the bank-year
observations with non-missing total assets and is
balanced both across time and countries.2 The
descriptive statistics of bank level and macroeco-
nomic variables are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
We distinguish three ownership categories:
foreign, private domestic and state-owned
domestic banks. A foreign ownership dummy
Foreign takes value 1 if at least 50% of bank capi-
tal is owned by foreign entities. A state ownership
dummy State is defined analogously based on
the share of domestic state-related entities. These
variables capture potentially different manage-
ment practices, business objectives, know-how
and ease in accessing sources of capital and are,
by construction, mutually exclusive.
2. The countries in our sample are: Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. We present detailed data coverage
by country, by year and by ownership in Tables 10 and
11 in Appendix S1 to this paper. Schmitz (2004) compares
Bankscope data with the IMF data in the International Finan-
cial Statistics for the asset side of the banking sector and
finds that approximately 70–90% of total banking assets is
covered by Bankscope for the CEE countries. Mathieson and
Roldos (2001) estimate data coverage to be about 90%.
The importance of foreign banks in the CEE
region increased from 38% share of total assets
on average in 1998 to 74% in 2006 and remained
at the similar level ever since. The share of total
assets owned by state banks went down from 47%
on average in 1998 to 12% in 2012. There is also
substantial heterogeneity across countries. For
example, Czechia, Lithuania, and Slovakia had
more than 90% of their banking sectors foreign-
owned in 2012, while Slovenia had only 23%,
followed by Hungary (52%) and Latvia (59%).
Slovenia and Poland had more than 20% of their
banking assets in state hands in 2012, while
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania,
Latvia, and Slovakia all had below 5%.3
Following related literature (Allen et al. 2017;
De Haas and van Lelyveld 2006; Micco and
Panizza 2006) we define five core bank-level
variables. Our dependent variable ΔNetLoans is
the real percentage growth of net loans. Size
measures bank’s prominence in the host country
banking sector as a share of bank’s total assets
in all banks’ assets in a given country in a given
year. Profitability is defined as a ratio of oper-
ating profit over total assets, Capitalization as a
ratio of total equity over total assets and Liquid-
ity as a ratio of liquid assets over total assets.
All original variables are denominated in local
currencies. The growth of loans was the slowest,
but also the most volatile, in state owned banks.
Foreign banks are less liquid and less capitalized
than other banks while state banks rely on liq-
uid assets the most and have the highest capital-
ization. Foreign banks are larger than domestic
private banks but smaller than the state-owned
banks. Profitability is highest in foreign banks
and lowest for state-owned banks.
We extend core bank-level controls with
additional variables. ΔC-Dep and ΔB-Dep are
the real rate of growth of deposits from con-
sumers and banks. Correspondingly, C-Funding
and B-Funding are the ratios of consumer and
bank deposits over total bank assets. Interest
Expenditure is calculated as a ratio of total
interest expenses over total assets. State-owned
and foreign-owned banks rely less on consumer
deposit and more on deposits from banks than the
private domestic banks. Foreign banks have the
lowest and state banks have the highest interest
expenditure. FXshare is calculated as a share
of a sum of foreign-currency denominated or
3. Additional information on the ownership split across
countries and over time is provided in Tables 8 and 9 in
Appendix S1 to this paper.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics: Bank Level Variables
Foreign Private Domestic State Domestic
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
ΔNetLoans 11.17 7.66 25.61 13.31 10.09 26.23 9.16 6.02 27.04
Size 4.63 1.97 6.45 3.08 1.05 5.78 5.31 2.18 7.18
Liquidity 26.31 22.56 19.58 28.87 26.17 18.54 37.46 34.71 24.51
Capitalization 11.83 10.05 7.95 13.50 10.52 10.01 14.86 9.97 13.15
Profitability 0.90 1.05 2.19 0.78 0.94 2.59 0.70 0.73 2.75
ΔC-Dep 9.15 4.99 24.60 15.02 10.84 24.53 7.77 5.26 26.91
ΔB-Dep 26.30 6.76 76.12 31.18 7.41 90.57 26.03 5.39 81.11
C-Funding 54.15 57.74 22.70 64.49 69.19 20.23 48.47 63.54 31.40
B-Funding 33.88 30.18 22.42 21.94 16.15 19.59 35.61 23.84 27.04
Interest Expenditure 3.34 2.72 2.77 3.47 3.09 2.63 4.05 3.00 4.11
FXshare 49.38 52.86 29.06 44.66 49.00 29.22 34.79 26.34 26.47
Notes: The sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data
sources are described in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All variables are expressed in percentage points.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics: Macroeconomic Variables
Mean Median SD
ΔMP −0.80 −0.31 2.24
ΔGDP 3.09 3.90 3.71
Inflation 5.10 3.90 4.31
ΔCHF 3.55 2.26 9.74
ΔEUR 1.46 0.00 9.10
Notes: The sample is 10 CEE countries in years
1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data
sources are described in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper.
All variables are expressed in percentage points.
foreign-currency linked loans in the total value
of loans. Foreign-owned banks have the highest,
while state-owned banks have the lowest share of
foreign-currency loans. The results of t-tests of
between group differences, conditional on bank
ownership and pairwise correlations between
bank level controls are reported in Tables 2 and
3 in Appendix S1 to this paper.
We calculate ΔMP as the yearly difference of
the nominal average central bank repo rate in a
host country, similar to Gambacorta (2005). Repo
rates directly impact on a broad array of the short
term money market rates and their changes are
considered in the literature (Bernanke and Blin-
der 1992) to be standard proxies for monetary
policy shocks in the short term. Accordingly, a
positive value of ΔMP indicates monetary policy
tightening and a negative value, loosening. Our
sample covers rich variation in the stance of mon-
etary policy: between 1998 and 2012 loosening
stood for about 60% of all covered cases.
Next, we introduce ΔGDP, the real GDP
growth rate to control for cyclical variation in
bank balance sheets and proxy for sector-wide
demand effects, and Inflation measured by the
percentage growth of the consumer price index.
High inflation in the CEE region was corre-
lated with overall macroeconomic instability of
the posttransition period. We account for non-
standard circumstances of the global financial cri-
sis by introducing a dummy Crisis that equals 1
for the years 2008–2010. ΔEUR and ΔCHF are
rate of change in the value of the local currency
against the euro and the Swiss franc. A positive
value indicates local currency depreciation. Pair-
wise correlations between macroeconomic vari-
ables are reported in Table 7 in Appendix S1 to
this paper.
III. MONETARY POLICY, OWNERSHIP, AND BANK
LOANS
In this section we estimate different versions
of the following regression using data on bank i
in country j in year t:
ΔNetLoansi,j,t = 𝛽ΔMP × ΔMP + 𝛽O
(1)
× Owneri,t + 𝛽ΔMP×Owner × ΔMPj,t × Owneri,t
+ 𝛽NetLoans × ΔNetLoansi,j,t−1 + 𝛽B × Banki,t
+ 𝛽E × Economyj,t + 𝛽E×OEconomyj,t
× Owneri,t + 𝛽j,t + 𝜀i,t,
where ΔMP is a change in the monetary policy
rate, Owner includes the ownership dummies
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and Bank includes core bank-level controls: Liq-
uidity, Capitalization, Profitability, and Size. To
control for possible demand-side effects on the
growth of credit we employ two versions of
macro controls set in the Economy vector. In the
first set, we include ΔGDP and Inflation, and
country and time fixed effects: 𝛽 j, t = 𝛽 j + 𝛽 t. In
the second set, we use only country× time fixed
effects 𝛽 j, t = 𝛽 j, t. This allows us to perfectly
control for all non-systematic factors that affect
banks’ credit growth in any given country in any
given year. However, since monetary policy is
also country-time specific, this specification does
not permit studying the effects of the key variable
ΔMP. We report which set is used in each regres-
sion. To study whether credit responses to mon-
etary policy changes are heterogenous in own-
ership we introduce interactions of ΔMP with
Owner variables.
If the regression coefficient 𝛽ΔMP is signifi-
cant and negative we can expect the bank lend-
ing channel to be at work while differences in
its working among banks of different ownership
will be picked up by the interaction coefficients
𝛽ΔMP×Owner. Thus, we focus on the supply-side
effects of monetary policy by identifying owner-
ship as a credit-supply side driver. We also allow
for interactions between ΔGDP and Inflation and
ownership dummies to capture potentially dif-
ferent responses to demand shifts across owner-
ship types.
We explicitly allow for autoregressive dynam-
ics in the growth rate of our bank credit variable.
It is well recognized (Adams-Kane, Caballero,
and Lim 2017; Claessens and Van Horen 2014;
Gambacorta 2005; Wu, Luca, and Jeon 2011)
that the presence of bank-specific controls and
lagged dependent variable induces an endogene-
ity problem. Thus, our method of choice is the
system-GMM approach based on Arellano and
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with
robust standard errors. In this estimation we allow
the dependent variable to be potentially auto-
correlated and contemporary bank controls to
be endogenous. We assume that macro controls,
monetary policy and ownership are exogenous
to the growth of credit at the bank level (we
relax some of these assumptions in Section 2 in
Appendix S1 to this paper). As the system-GMM
approach often suffers from the instruments pro-
liferation problem, for each regression we report
the p value of Hansen J-test of overidentifying
restrictions. We also report the value of F-test of
overall model fit and p values of Arellano-Bond
autocorrelation tests of dependent variable of
orders one and two.4
A. Benchmark Results
Table 3 presents results of the benchmark
estimations of Equation (1). We reject the null
hypothesis that the AR(1) coefficient is equal to
zero, but we fail to reject the null hypothesis that
the AR(2) coefficient is equal to zero. This vali-
dates our specification with one lag of the depen-
dent variable.
In columns 1 and 2 we estimate Equation (1)
without the monetary policy indicator. This
allows us to build intuition about “pure” owner-
ship effects and compare the predictions on Bank
and Economy controls with earlier work that
focused on CEE countries but did not consider
monetary policy. We find that credit growth is
slower in larger, more liquid, more capitalized,
and less profitable banks. Credit growth acceler-
ates in booms and slows down in recessions with
one percentage increase in GDP growth rate lead-
ing to approximately 0.5–0.8 percentage point
increase in credit growth rate. Higher inflation
hampers the growth of credit: an increase in the
consumer price index by one percentage point
implies a reduction in the credit growth rate by
approximately 1.2–1.4 percentage points. All of
the effects of Bank and Economy controls are in
line with previous studies. Finally, as ownership
dummies are insignificantly different from zero,
we conclude credit growth does not depend on
bank ownership per se (as is does in e.g., Allen
et al. (2017))
The estimation in column 3 does not include
the ownership dummies but it includes the mone-
tary policy indicator. We find evidence that mon-
etary policy tightening reduces the growth of
credit at the bank level in all banks: a one per-
centage point increase in the monetary policy
rate decreases bank credit growth by 0.6 per-
centage points on average. However, this num-
ber masks a substantial variation in the impact
of monetary policy on credit dynamics in banks
4. Due to instruments proliferation problem we put less
trust in results obtained using bank-fixed effects, which are
available upon request. In using country, time and coun-
try× time fixed effects instead of bank fixed effects we fol-
low the literature including Adams-Kane, Caballero, and
Lim (2017), Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005), Brown
and De Haas (2012), Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and
Perri (2013), Temesvary and Banai (2017). Bank fixed effects
are usually used in static panels like in Aydin (2008), Micco
and Panizza (2006), Temesvary (2018).
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Table 3
Benchmark Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans
Foreign −1.529 −1.868 −1.165 −0.931 0.245 0.666
(1.628) (1.571) (1.978) (1.961) (2.139) (2.112)
State 3.508 3.146 5.710 6.430
(3.132) (3.308) (4.324) (4.550)
ΔMP −0.626* −1.583*** −1.821***
(0.348) (0.546) (0.615)
ΔMP×Foreign 1.317** 1.725** 1.555** 2.133***
(0.634) (0.687) (0.686) (0.718)
ΔGDP×Foreign 0.087 −0.034 −0.155 −0.294
(0.246) (0.248) (0.234) (0.223)
Inflation×Foreign −0.255 −0.210 −0.200 −0.186
(0.311) (0.327) (0.335) (0.340)
ΔMP× State 0.864 1.282
(1.136) (1.157)




LaggedΔNetLoans 0.221*** 0.238*** 0.234*** 0.222*** 0.237*** 0.219*** 0.232***
(0.037) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.038) (0.044)
Size −0.692*** −0.529** −0.789*** −0.694*** −0.538** −0.702*** −0.554**
(0.249) (0.229) (0.252) (0.245) (0.228) (0.249) (0.234)
Liquidity −0.356*** −0.398*** −0.359*** −0.355*** −0.399*** −0.359*** −0.400***
(0.092) (0.100) (0.095) (0.095) (0.102) (0.091) (0.097)
Capitalization −0.568** −0.548** −0.620** −0.580** −0.538** −0.578*** −0.536**
(0.224) (0.248) (0.242) (0.239) (0.260) (0.221) (0.243)
Profitability 1.472*** 1.438*** 1.450*** 1.504*** 1.321*** 1.482*** 1.309***
(0.423) (0.427) (0.424) (0.408) (0.400) (0.412) (0.402)
ΔGDP 0.556** 0.583** 0.576* 0.797***
(0.238) (0.240) (0.310) (0.295)
Inflation −1.346*** −1.362*** −1.193*** −1.240***
(0.205) (0.208) (0.322) (0.344)
Observations 2017 2022 2075 2008 2008 2008 2008
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
Country×Year FE No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Economy×Owner No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of banks 332 332 343 331 331 331 331
F 30.11 84.93 31.44 29.51 80.21 28.31 82.41
AB AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB AR(2) test 0.82 0.90 0.89 0.79 0.74 0.76 0.76
Hansen J 0.37 0.57 0.29 0.40 0.59 0.37 0.59
ΔMP+ΔMP×Foreign = 0 0.53 0.52
ΔMP+ΔMP× State = 0 0.33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The
sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data sources are described
in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report system-GMM estimates. Models (1) and (2) abstract from monetary
policy indicator and focus on ownership, model (3) abstracts from ownership variables, models (4)–(7) include ownership and
monetary policy. Regressions (1), (3), (4) and (6) include country and time fixed effects and economy-controls. Regressions (2),
(5) and (7) include country× time fixed effects instead. In models (1), (2), (6) and (7) private domestic banks are the reference
group. In models (4) and (5) private and state domestic banks are the reference group. Bottom rows show p values of the Wald
test of the null that a sum of respective coefficients is equal to zero. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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of different ownership, as subsequent columns of
Table 3 reveal.
The estimations in columns 4 and 5 include
the foreign ownership dummy and its interactions
with ΔMP, ΔGDP and Inflation. The coefficient
on monetary policy indicator, 𝛽ΔMP, is statisti-
cally significant and economically important. A
one percentage point tightening leads to an aver-
age decrease of 1.6 percentage point in credit
growth in domestic banks. The loans issued by
foreign banks react less to monetary policy, as
𝛽ΔMP× Foreign is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. In fact, loans issued by foreign banks are
immune to monetary policy. Formally, we apply
the Wald test on the null hypothesis that the sum
𝛽ΔMP + 𝛽ΔMP×Foreign is zero. There is no evi-
dence to reject the null which is confirmed in the
one but last row of Table 3 in column 4 where we
report the p value of this test (low value indicat-
ing low probability of the null). Last, there is no
significant difference in how inflation and GDP
growth affect bank lending between foreign and
domestic banks.
The estimations in columns 6 and 7 include
both ownership dummies and their interactions.
A one percentage point tightening leads to an
average decrease of 1.8 percentage point in
credit growth in domestic banks. Again, there
is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that
𝛽ΔMP + 𝛽ΔMP×Foreign = 0. We find no evidence
of different response of credit growth to mone-
tary policy between private domestic and state
owned domestic banks, but as there are few state
owned banks in the sample, the precision of the
estimate of 𝛽ΔMP + 𝛽ΔMP× State is low. Interest-
ingly, lending of state banks is counter-cyclical:
the coefficient on ΔGDP× State interaction is
significant and negative. This can be rationalized
by those banks submitting to political pressures
and extending credit in recessions (Micco and
Panizza 2006).
There is some variation in the size of estimated
coefficients for bank-level, and macroeconomic
controls. The same holds for the interactions
of ownership and macroeconomic controls.
However, their signs and significance levels
are remarkably stable. This holds in all sub-
sequent estimations and hence, for the sake of
brevity, in the remainder of the paper we do
not report the estimates for Bank, Economy and
Economy ×Owner controls. Next, we verify
the robustness of the result on lending by for-
eign banks being immune to local monetary
policy.
B. Inside the Bank Lending Channel
The basic premise of the first robustness
exercise is to check if foreign ownership is not
simply a stand-in for heterogeneity in other bank
characteristics. The traditional view of the bank
lending channel (Kashyap and Stein 2000) is
that the impact of monetary policy on lending
behavior, due to a drop in nonsecured deposits, is
stronger for banks with less liquid balance sheets.
Gambacorta (2005) argues that less capitalized
banks, due to higher degree of informational
frictions in financial markets, face larger costs
in raising non-secured deposits and are forced
to reduce their lending by more. Thus, we intro-
duce interactions of ΔMP with Capitalization
and Liquidity in Equation (1). If the coefficient
𝛽ΔMP×Foreign is not significantly different from
zero in this richer regression, we will conclude
that foreign ownership is a proxy for a superior
access to funding and liquidity.
The results are reported in Table 4. Columns 1
and 2 present the estimates of a regression with
added interactions of ΔMP with Liquidity and
Capitalization with all domestic banks as the ref-
erence group. In columns 3 and 4 private domes-
tic banks are the reference group. The estimates
of ΔMP ×Foreign are positive and statistically
significant across all specifications. Thus, the dif-
ferent response of credit related to ownership is
not explained by the cross-sectional differences
in liquidity and funding access.
The coefficients on the added interactions
are negative but are not significantly different
from zero. Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marques-
Ibanez (2010) argue that financial innovation and
access to new ways of transferring credit risk
have diminished the informational content of
standard bank balance sheet indicators, like Cap-
italization or Liquidity. The results in this section
support the financial innovation view: banks that
are more liquid and better capitalized actually do
worse in mitigating the effects of monetary pol-
icy changes on their lending. In our sample, as
demonstrated in Table 1, state-owned banks rely
on liquid assets the most and have, on average,
highest Capitalization. All this is consistent with
Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005b) who argue
that in the CEE region only the least efficient
state-owned banks have not been privatized.
C. Foreign-Currency Loans
In recent years there has been an increase in
bank lending in foreign currencies in the CEE
countries. Ongena, Schindele, and Vonnák (2017)
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Table 4
Robustness: Inside the Bank Lending Channel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans
Foreign −1.303 −1.036 0.378 0.739





ΔMP×Foreign 1.137* 1.513** 1.648** 2.151***
(0.686) (0.725) (0.699) (0.747)
ΔMP× State 1.822 2.127*
(1.306) (1.285)
ΔMP×Capitalization −0.017 −0.022 −0.024 −0.031
(0.036) (0.040) (0.031) (0.035)
ΔMP×Liquidity −0.034 −0.025 −0.039* −0.032
(0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024)
Observations 2008 2008 2008 2008
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy controls Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Country×Year FE No Yes No Yes
Economy×Owner Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of banks 331 331 331 331
F 28.92 81.56 27.71 84.14
AB AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB AR(2) test 0.75 0.74 0.70 0.80
Hansen J 0.39 0.71 0.37 0.64
ΔMP+ΔMP×Foreign = 0 0.28 0.11
ΔMP+ΔMP× State = 0 0.26
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The
sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data sources are described
in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report system-GMM estimates. All models include interactions of monetary
policy indicator with bank controls. Estimates for other macro and bank controls are suppressed. Regressions in odd-numbered
columns include country and time fixed effects and macrocontrols. Regressions in even-numbered columns include country× time
fixed effects instead. In models (1) and (2) private and state domestic banks are the reference group. In models (3) and (4) private
domestic banks are the reference group. Bottom rows show p values of the Wald test of the null that a sum of respective coefficients
is equal to zero. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
provide compelling evidence that supply of bank
credit in a foreign currency is less sensitive to
changes in domestic monetary conditions than
the equivalent supply in the domestic currency.
Therefore, if loan currency composition differs
between foreign and domestic banks, one should
observe different reactions to monetary policy
between foreign and domestic banks. Interest-
ingly, Table 2 in Appendix S1 to this paper reveals
that unconditionally there is no significant differ-
ence between foreign and private domestic banks
in currency composition of their loan portfolios.
Only the differences between state owned banks
and other groups are significant.
We conduct two exercises. First, we replace
the Foreign ownership dummy with FXshare.
Second, we estimate a regression with both
variables and their interactions with ΔMP. The
results of these exercises are reported in Table 5.
In columns 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient
on FXShare is positive, but statistically not
significant. The same holds for the coefficient on
the interaction term ΔMP×FXShare. In further
estimations we include the monetary policy
indicator ΔMP and its interactions with foreign
ownership dummy in columns 3 and 4 and with
both ownership dummies in columns 5 and 6.
The benchmark result: a negative estimate of
ΔMP and a positive estimate of ΔMP×Foreign
is robust to controlling for the share of foreign
currency loans. The positive and significant
estimate on FXShare in columns 4 and 6 implies
that banks more inclined to issue loans in foreign
currencies enjoyed larger demand and hence,
larger growth of loans.
However, due to data limitations, we must take
these results with a grain of salt. There is a sys-




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans
Foreign −1.227 5.924 −1.291 5.939*
(3.110) (3.592) (3.202) (3.567)
State 2.469 1.859
(4.139) (4.630)
ΔMP −1.813 −2.583** −2.593**
(1.172) (1.127) (1.129)
ΔMP×Foreign 2.425** 3.003*** 3.048*** 3.002***
(0.993) (1.021) (1.101) (0.966)
ΔMP× State 1.363 1.000
(1.196) (0.875)
FXshare 0.033 0.051 0.041 0.060* 0.037 0.056*
(0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
ΔMP×FXshare 0.017 0.024 0.006 0.006 −0.004 0.004
(0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019)
Observations 472 472 472 472 472 472
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country×Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Economy×Owner No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. banks 102 102 102 102 102 102
F 300.52 58.89 322.66 33.15 298.73 91.68
AB AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB AR(2) test 1.00 0.89 0.78 0.52 0.94 0.67
Hansen J 0.86 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.78 1.00
ΔMP+ΔMP×Foreign = 0 0.90 0.74
ΔMP+ΔMP× State = 0 0.33
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The
sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data sources are described
in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report system-GMM estimates. Estimates for other macro and bank controls
are suppressed. Regressions in odd-numbered columns include country and time fixed effects and macrocontrols. Regressions
in even-numbered columns include country× time fixed effects instead. Models (1) and (2) do not control for the ownership. In
models (3) and (4) private and state domestic banks are the reference group. In models (5) and (6) private domestic banks are the
reference group. Bottom rows show p values of the Wald test of the null that a sum of respective coefficients is equal to zero. The
numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
standards in our sample.5 Before 2004, that is
before the countries in CEE started joining the
European Union, financial statements are signifi-
cantly less detailed and currency composition of
loans is almost never reported which is the reason
for a significant drop in the number of observa-
tions in Table 5.
To circumvent these data availability issues, a
natural extension is to study the role of currency
fluctuations for dynamics of bank loans. If differ-
ences in FXShare go beyond the reported data,
then fluctuations in the value of local currency
5. Approximately 60% of observations come from the
last 4 years of our sample. Also, smaller banks tend to present
less detailed financial statements hence the incidence of
FXshare variable is tilted towards larger banks and banks with
foreign ownership. Only 10% of all observations come from
the state-owned banks.
can impact on the coefficient on ΔMP×Foreign.
This effect would then be detected by including
fluctuations in the local currency in the estima-
tion. We use changes in the exchange rate of the
local currency against the euro ΔEUR and the
Swiss franc ΔCHF together with their interac-
tions with the ownership dummies.6
The correlation between the ΔMP variable
and fluctuations in the exchange rates (see Table
7 in Appendix S1 to this paper) are small and
equal to −0.21 for ΔEUR and− 0.18 for ΔCHF:
when monetary policy tightens, the local cur-
rency appreciates slightly. Hence, following a
monetary policy tightening, the value of loans in
6. We implicitly assume that the variation in ΔMP does
not prompt demand shifts between local and foreign cur-
rency loans.
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Table 6
Robustness: Currency Fluctuations

















Foreign −0.708 −0.252 0.518 1.241 −0.775 −1.186 0.954 0.298
(2.039) (2.039) (2.236) (2.284) (2.314) (2.373) (2.386) (2.418)
State 5.303 6.325 6.622 6.473
(4.419) (4.633) (4.730) (5.161)
ΔMP −1.583*** −1.811*** −1.784*** −2.188***
(0.546) (0.616) (0.615) (0.637)
ΔMP×Foreign 1.302** 1.699** 1.528** 2.092*** 1.371** 1.781** 1.771** 2.398***
(0.635) (0.688) (0.687) (0.719) (0.694) (0.745) (0.707) (0.765)
ΔMP× State 0.837 1.251 1.255 1.782
(1.131) (1.140) (1.236) (1.245)
ΔCHF −0.056 −0.115
(0.163) (0.202)
ΔCHF×Foreign −0.148 −0.222 −0.083 −0.170
(0.162) (0.171) (0.192) (0.198)




ΔEUR×Foreign 0.054 −0.006 0.229 0.058
(0.251) (0.250) (0.350) (0.327)
ΔEUR× State 0.424 0.117
(0.440) (0.440)
Observations 2008 2008 2008 2008 1,610 1,610 1,610 1,610
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country×Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Economy×Owner Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. banks 331 331 331 331 294 294 294 294
F 29 81 27 87 20 18 18 18
AB AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB AR(2) test 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.30 0.55 0.30 0.49
Hansen J 0.47 0.65 0.36 0.65 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.90
ΔMP+ΔMP×Foreign = 0 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.33
ΔMP+ΔMP× State = 0 0.32 0.40
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The
sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data sources are described
in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report system-GMM estimates. Estimates for other macro and bank controls
are suppressed. Regressions in odd-numbered columns include country and time fixed effects and macrocontrols. Regressions
in even-numbered columns include country×time fixed effects instead. In models (1) and (2) and (4) and (5) private and state
domestic banks are the reference group. In models (3) and (4) and (7) and (8) private domestic banks are the reference group.
Models (1)–(4) control for fluctuations in the local currency against Swiss frank, models (5)–(8) control fluctuations in local
currency against the euro. The number of observations in columns 5–8 drops because several countries in the sample had either
pegged their currency to the euro or adopted it. Bottom rows show p values of the Wald test of the null that a sum of respective
coefficients is equal to zero. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
foreign currency decreases, mechanically lead-
ing to a negative correlation between mone-
tary policy rate and growth of loans for banks
with a higher share of foreign currency loans.
This mechanism goes against our benchmark
result. However, there are other factors that can
affect exchange rate (e.g., foreign country mon-
etary policy, trade flows), weakening the link
between ΔMP and ΔNetLoans. Hence, we let the
data speak.
Table 6 reports the results of this robustness
exercise. The benchmark result that the supply
of loans in foreign banks is immune to local
monetary policy is firmly robust. The coefficients
on ΔCHF and ΔEUR are negative, albeit not
significantly different from zero.
Coefficients on the interactions with the own-
ership dummies are not significantly different
from zero as well. Intuitively, this is consis-
tent with the fact that the difference in FXShare
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between domestic and foreign banks is small
and that there is only weak relationship between
ΔMP and exchange rates. This yields the cur-
rency fluctuations to be quantitatively insignifi-
cant for the bank lending channel in the sample.
Another possibility is that currency fluctuations
have short-term effects which cannot be detected
in the annual data.
D. Global Financial Crisis
Could it be that the results reported in
Table 3 are driven by the global financial cri-
sis? One could argue that a positive coefficient
on ΔMP×Foreign results from a differential
response of foreign bank lending during a
global turmoil. Monetary policy interest rates
were slashed to mitigate liquidity dry-up in the
financial markets. If lending in foreign banks
decreased by more than it did in domestic banks
in that time (as Allen et al. (2017) have found)
this could manifest itself as the significant,
positive interaction term.
Hence, we extend model (1) to include inter-
actions with the Crisis dummy.7 The results of
this exercise are reported in Table 7. In col-
umn 1 we interact the monetary policy indicator
with the Crisis dummy. Accounting for the cri-
sis, the estimated coefficient on ΔMP is signifi-
cant and implies an effect of monetary policy on
bank loans stronger by approximately one third
than the benchmark estimate (𝛽ΔMP decreases
from −0.626 in Table 3 to −0.8 in Table 7). The
coefficient on ΔMP×Crisis is positive. This is
because during the global financial crisis lend-
ing and interest rates were going down at the
same time, opposite to what the bank lending
channel theory predicts. Importantly, the Wald
test does not reject the null hypothesis that the
sum 𝛽ΔMP + 𝛽ΔMP×Crisis is equal to zero. Thus,
changes in the monetary policy rate had no effects
on the credit growth at the bank level during the
global financial crisis.
In columns 2 and 3 we introduce the foreign
ownership dummy and its interactions, and in
columns 4 and 5 we introduce both ownership
dummies and their interactions. Qualitatively, we
confirm our first result: credit in foreign banks
does not respond to monetary policy in tran-
quil times while in domestic banks it does. The
effect of monetary policy on domestic banks’
credit growth in tranquil times is stronger than
7. We do not introduce the dummy itself as it is a
linear combination of year fixed effects and country-year
fixed effects.
the benchmark estimates. Interestingly, we do
not find evidence that lending by foreign banks
decreased by more or less during the crisis com-
pared to domestic banks: the coefficient on Cri-
sis×Foreign is not significantly different from
zero across all specifications.
In column 4 the effect of monetary policy on
private domestic banks in tranquil times is strong
and significant. A one percentage point tightening
of monetary policy leads to a reduction of 2.2 per-
centage points in credit growth. Again, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that credit growth in
foreign banks does not react to monetary policy
in tranquil times. Similarly, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that credit growth in state-owned
banks does not react to monetary policy in tran-
quil times.
The coefficient on Crisis× State is positive,
albeit insignificant. This is different than Allen
et al. (2017) who find that state-owned banks
played stabilizing role by increasing their lend-
ing during the global financial crisis. This differ-
ence derives from the fact that our specification
includes the interaction of State and ΔGDP.8
To sum up, the lack of response of foreign
banks’ credit to monetary policy is not driven
by the global financial crisis. The bank lend-
ing channel was simply not active during that
time. We find that monetary policy affects bank
loans only in tranquil times and that foreign
bank loans remain immune to monetary policy.
This is different than results in Wu, Luca, and
Jeon (2011). In their sample, different response
of credit to monetary policy in foreign banks is
predominant during crisis episodes. Their study
has a broader geographical coverage (CEE, Latin
America and South-East Asia countries), and the
countries in those regions had different monetary
policy instruments, targets and implementation.
Also, their time-frame of 1996–2003, unlike our
sample, includes many episodes of local banking
crises and no global financial crises. The excep-
tional magnitude of the global financial crisis
(and a different definition of “crisis times”) is
another plausible cause for the different results.
IV. WHAT DRIVES THE DIFFERENCE?
Having established the robustness of bank
ownership as a driver of different responses of
credit to monetary policy rate, we now turn to
8. In a regression without Economy × Owner interac-
tions, the Crisis × State coefficient is positive and significant.
The estimation results are available upon request.
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Table 7
Robustness: Global Financial Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans 𝚫NetLoans
Foreign −1.303 −1.114 −0.163 0.095
(2.195) (2.237) (2.315) (2.279)
State 5.061 5.529
(4.637) (4.988)
ΔMP −0.808** −1.886*** −2.246***
(0.408) (0.696) (0.771)
ΔMP×Foreign 1.415* 1.965** 1.784** 2.540***
(0.844) (0.911) (0.904) (0.948)
ΔMP× State 1.052 1.519
(1.454) (1.441)
Crisis×Foreign −0.443 −1.126 0.184 −0.428
(2.474) (2.531) (2.543) (2.337)
Crisis× State 2.404 2.636
(4.879) (5.101)
ΔMP×Crisis 1.006 1.419 1.810
(0.661) (1.070) (1.151)
Foreign×ΔMP×Crisis −0.246 −0.913 −0.643 −1.484
(1.277) (1.272) (1.403) (1.357)
State×ΔMP×Crisis −0.362 −0.745
(2.273) (2.318)
Observations 2075 2008 2008 2008 2008
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy controls Yes Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes No
Country×Year FE No No Yes No Yes
Economy×Owner No Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. banks 343 331 331 331 331
F 31.31 28.80 80.33 26.52 87.27
AB AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB AR(2) test 0.83 0.73 0.72 0.69 0.75
Hansen J 0.30 0.39 0.67 0.38 0.60
ΔMP+ΔMP×Crisis = 0 0.71 0.55 0.60
ΔMP+ΔMP×Foreign = 0 0.36 0.37
ΔMP+ΔMP×State = 0 0.34
ΔMP in Foreign in Crisis = 0 0.24 0.24
ΔMP in State in Crisis = 0 0.85
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the real rate of growth of net loans at the bank level. The
sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data sources are described
in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report system-GMM estimates. Estimates for other macro and bank controls
are suppressed. Model (1) abstracts from ownership variables and focuses on monetary policy effects in tranquil and crisis times.
Models (2)–(5) include monetary policy and ownership variables. Regressions (1), (2) and (4) include country and time fixed
effects and economy-controls. Regressions (3) and (5) include country × time fixed effects instead. In models (1)–(3) private
and state domestic banks are the reference group. In models (4) and (5) private domestic banks are the reference group. Bottom
rows show p values of the Wald test of the null that a sum of respective coefficients is equal to zero. The numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
determining the causes of this fact. The supply
driven bank lending channel originates from a
fall in deposits as a response to a monetary
contraction. Therefore, we turn our attention to
the trigger of the bank lending channel, namely,
how deposits respond to monetary policy. Anal-
ogously to Section 3, we estimate the following
dynamic panel equation for deposits:
ΔDepositsi,j,t = 𝛽ΔMP × ΔMPj,t + 𝛽O
(2)
× Owneri,t + 𝛽𝛥𝑀𝑃×Owner × 𝛥𝑀𝑃 × Owneri,t
+ 𝛽Dept−1 × ΔDepositsi,j,t−1 + 𝛽Dept−2
× ΔDepositsi,j,t−2 + 𝛽B × Banki,t
+ 𝛽E × Economyj,t + 𝛽E,OEconomyj,t
× Owneri,t + 𝛽j,t + 𝜀i,t.
The dependent variable is either C-Dep, a real
percentage growth of net consumer consumer
deposits or B-Dep, a real percentage growth of
deposits from banks. We include two lags of the




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
𝚫C-Dep 𝚫C-Dep 𝚫C-Dep 𝚫B-Dep 𝚫B-Dep 𝚫B-Dep
Foreign −3.388 −4.413* −3.226 −3.171
(2.336) (2.417) (10.492) (10.650)
State −8.829** −7.849* 2.505 −0.063
(4.421) (4.619) (16.746) (16.699)
ΔMP 0.371 −1.746*** −1.699 −7.348
(0.724) (0.514) (1.726) (5.108)
ΔMP×Foreign 1.723*** 1.621** 5.700 6.218
(0.608) (0.629) (5.372) (5.316)
ΔMP× State 1.775* 1.553 8.682 9.567*
(1.014) (1.176) (5.347) (5.684)
Observations 1,695 1,648 1,648 1,697 1,634 1,634
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Country×Year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Economy×Owner No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. banks 298 289 289 307 295 295
F 15.50 13.97 68.44 4.68 5.64 21.85
AB AR(1) test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AB AR(2) test 0.86 0.33 0.35 0.60 0.39 0.35
Hansen J 0.21 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.31 0.65
ΔMP+ΔMP× Foreign = 0 0.96 0.39
ΔMP+ΔMP× State = 0 0.97 0.49
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is: the real rate of growth of consumer deposits at the bank
level in models (1)–(3) and deposits from banks and financial entities at the bank level in models (4)–(6). The sample is 453
banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012. Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in Table
1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report system-GMM estimates. Estimates for other macro and bank controls are
suppressed. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 include country and time fixed effects and macrocontrols. Regressions
in columns 3 and 6 include country× time fixed effects instead. In models (2) and (3) and (5) and (6) private domestic banks are
the reference group. Bottom rows show p values of the Wald test of the null that a sum of respective coefficients is equal to zero.
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
for B-Dep because of evidence of autoregression
in residuals when only one lag was used in the
former case. The selection of controls together
with model fit and specification tests is the same
as in estimation of Equation (1).
The results of estimations of Equation (2)
are reported in Table 8. In columns 1–3 con-
sumer deposits are the dependent variable
while in columns 4–6 deposits from banks are
the dependent variable. In columns 1 and 4,
without accounting for ownership, we do not
find the monetary policy to have any impact
on bank deposits. The subsequent estimations
reveal that this result masks substantial hetero-
geneity in consumer deposits reaction between
ownership types.
We find that after a monetary contraction pri-
vate domestic banks have difficulties to raise
deposits: a 1 percentage point increase in the pol-
icy rate reduces the rate of growth of deposits
by 1.2 percentage point. Foreign banks do not
face this issue. The rate of growth of deposits in
foreign banks does not react to changes in the
monetary rate. This is an important result. The
bank lending channel is not only weaker in for-
eign banks, as previous studies have found, but
it is entirely absent. Since deposits do not fall in
the wake of a monetary contraction, there is no
trigger to initiate a response in credit. This is con-
sistent with the benchmark result on lending in
foreign banks being immune to monetary policy.
Regarding deposits from banks, we see that
there is essentially no evidence that bank own-
ership matters for how those deposits respond
to monetary policy. The coefficient 𝛽ΔMP in
columns 4 and 5 is negative, but not statistically
significant. We conclude that monetary policy
does not matter for the dynamics of deposits from
other banks.
Beck and Brown (2015) argue that foreign
banks cherry-pick their clients. Foreign banks
may attract deposits from households who
weakly respond to monetary policy shocks.
This can be due to earnings, wealth and how
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financially constrained a household is. Similarly,
the Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis
of no response of deposits in state owned banks
to changes in ΔMP. State-owned banks usually
service public sector entities that do not engage
in active management of their liquidity position
in response to monetary policy changes.9
Thus, we find a novel fact, that there is no
response of consumer deposits to monetary pol-
icy in foreign and state-owned banks. The com-
position of funding matters as well, as deposits
from banks do not respond to monetary policy in
all banks. These two facts alone can fully explain
the benchmark result that foreign bank lending
is immune to local monetary policy. The trigger
of the bank lending channel, the adjustment of
deposits following a change in the monetary pol-
icy rate, is not activated in those banks.10
However, one question still remains, namely,
why loans issued by private domestic banks
respond to monetary policy in the first place?
Clearly, a part of this is that their consumer
deposits do drop following a monetary policy
tightening. However, one could imagine a coun-
terfactual scenario in which private domestic
banks relied more on deposits from banks,
possibly to the extent that would render local
monetary policy irrelevant for their lending as
well. Therefore, it is important to understand
the determinants and consequences of bank
funding structure.
V. FUNDING STRUCTURE
We expect that foreign banks rely more on
wholesale funding (deposits from banks), while
domestic banks rely more on retail funding (con-
sumer deposits), as suggested by unconditional
9. Another possible explanation involves deposit dollar-
ization, or, more precisely, euroization. This is highly het-
erogeneous across CEE economies, as shown in Brown and
Stix (2015). In 2012, more than 75% of bank deposits in
Croatia and more than 40% of deposits in Bulgaria were
denominated in foreign currency, predominantly the euro. By
contrast, the share of foreign currency deposits in Central
Europe (e.g., Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) in 2012
was below 15%. If foreign banks have more deposits euroiza-
tion and if changes in local monetary policy rate are uncor-
related with changes in the euro exchange rate, then local
monetary policy changes are less binding for the depositors of
foreign banks. However, we can not credibly pursue this line
of inquiry, as the data on currency composition of deposits are
of even lower quality than that on loans.
10. We address the relevance of the linkages to par-
ent banks in our sample in Section 2.3 in Appendix S1 to
this paper.
means in Table 1. To find if ownership is a stand-
alone factor for funding structure and costs, we
estimate the following regression with ordinary
least squares (OLS), including lagged bank-level
controls to avoid endogeneity:
Fundingi,j,t = 𝛽O × Owneri,t + 𝛽B(3)
× Banki,t−1 + 𝛽j + 𝜀i,j,t.
The dependent variable is deposits from
banks, consumer deposits and interest expenses
to total assets (funding costs). By doing this,
we verify whether ownership impacts on the
funding structure and funding costs in the long
run separately from other bank characteristics.11
Table 9 reports the results. There are signifi-
cant differences in the structure of funding and its
costs between foreign and domestic banks. The
share of deposits from banks in foreign banks’
funding is on average 10 percentage points higher
than that in private domestic banks. Interestingly,
state banks rely more on deposits from banks
and less on consumer deposits than both private
domestic banks and foreign banks. We view this
as additional evidence of importance of infor-
mation frictions in the interbank market. State
owned banks enjoy implicit government backing
which makes them a more trustworthy trading
partner to other banks.
Interest expenses to total assets are approx-
imately 0.5 percentage point lower for foreign
banks which corresponds to a one-sixth reduction
in those costs (as the average interest expense to
total assets in the sample is 3%). We find that the
coefficient on the State dummy in column 6 of
Table 9 is positive, albeit insignificantly differ-
ent from zero. State-owned banks do not manage
their liabilities as efficiently as foreign banks do.
State banks are less innovative and less efficient,
hence they incur larger costs. We conclude that
foreign ownership is a significant determinant of
the funding structure. This, together with results
reported in Table 8 explains why loans in domes-
tic banks respond to monetary policy while those
in foreign banks do not.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we provide new evidence on the
effects of monetary policy on bank loans dynam-
ics. We find that only domestic banks adjust their
11. We have also estimated this equation including time




Funding Structure and Costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Foreign 5.535*** 10.520*** −5.748*** −10.812*** −0.511*** −0.475***
(1.038) (1.092) (1.049) (1.105) (0.111) (0.111)
State 18.164*** −18.700*** 0.126
(1.910) (1.976) (0.218)
Lagged Size −0.345*** −0.456*** 0.369*** 0.485*** −0.009 −0.010
(0.050) (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) (0.007) (0.007)
Lagged Liquidity −0.180*** −0.202*** 0.198*** 0.221*** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) (0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Capitalization −0.008 −0.054 −0.668*** −0.628*** −0.029*** −0.030***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.058) (0.053) (0.005) (0.005)
Lagged Profitability −0.034 0.094 −0.061 −0.196 0.005 0.005
(0.214) (0.206) (0.221) (0.210) (0.029) (0.029)
Observations 2,380 2,380 2,368 2,368 2,555 2,555
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 33 40 39 45 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is: deposits from banks and financial entities to total assets
(B-Funding) in columns (1) and (2), total consumer deposits to total assets (C-Funding) in columns(3)–(4) and interest expenses
to total assets (funding costs, I-Expense) in columns (5)–(6). The sample is 453 banks in 10 CEE countries in years 1998–2012.
Details of all variables construction and data sources are described in Table 1 in Appendix S1 to this paper. All columns report OLS
estimates. Estimates for other macro and bank controls are suppressed. In models (1), (3) and (5) private and state domestic banks
are the reference group. In models (2), (4) and (6) private domestic banks are the reference group. The numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
loans to changes in host country’s monetary pol-
icy and that the bank lending channel is not trig-
gered in foreign-owned banks due to the lack of
response of their funding to monetary policy. We
also contribute to the literature on the effective-
ness of monetary policy during the global finan-
cial crisis.
Our findings suggest that there are important
differences in dynamics of deposits among for-
eign, state-owned and private domestic banks.
Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena (2011) argue
that borrowers in more concentrated markets face
higher switching costs which makes it easier for
banks to pass the increase in central bank rate
onto customers. The importance of market power
for loans is also confirmed in the recent work of
Wang et al. (2020). In our view, further investi-
gation of deposit markets, with a focus on market
power, in the context of the traditional bank lend-
ing channel literature is an interesting avenue for
the future research.
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